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A BSTRA C T
Throughout the history of Western philosophy knowledge was closely 
related to universality and to conceptual knowledge - supposedly 
constituting the core meaning of rationality: rational knowing should be 
conceptual if it is to be recognized as knowing at all. Although Aristotle 
clearly realized that individuality is not conceptually knowable, he side­
stepped this problem by introducing his secondary universal substantial 
form in order to safe-guard (conceptual) knowledge. A brief analysis 
of the further historical development of the relationship between 
universality and particu larity paves the way for discussing the manner 
in which Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven tackled this problem.
Vollenhoven's distinctions seem to be more fru itfu l, and are employed in 
order to get a better understanding of the nature of concept-formation
- which always proceeds in terms of universality. But firs t of all an 
alternative approach to the distinction between concept and idea is 
explored by referring to the twofold way in which one can use modal 
terms: conceptually (pointing to phenomena evincing themselves within 
the modal boundaries of an aspect) and in an idea-context (using modal 
terms to designate states of affairs transcending the limits of the modal 
aspect in which the descriptive term has its original seat).
Against this background it is possible to give a more articulated meaning 
to the terms rationalism and irrationalism - the former restricts all 
knowledge to conceptual knowledge whereas the latter only acknowledges 
idea-knowledge of reality in its uniqueness, contingency and 
individuality. This classification entails the implication that we have to 
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use the terms individualism and universalism in the sense of atomism and 
(w)holism.
At this point our analysis proceeds by evaluating certain central traits 
in the thought of Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven, Hart and Fowler. It is 
argued that particularly the latter two thinkers would benefit from using 
the mentioned distinction between concept and idea. In the case of Fowler 
it is also pointed out that his notion of God's "one and indivisible" will 
is still a demonstration of the after-effect of the rich Western legacy of 
a "simplicity-metaphysics" dating back, via Thomas Aquinas, Augustine 
and Plotinus, to Xenophanes. In connection with the influence of 
nominalism it is argued that Dooyeweerd indeed continued a central ele­
ment of no-minalism by ignoring the universal side (orderliness) of 
entities.
As far as the distinction between individuality and typ icality is 
concerned, reasons are advanced for using the term specify instead of 
individualize. This suggestion is closely connected with an alternative 
terminology for the dimension of entities in reality, framed differently 
by thinkers within reformational philosophy - such as individuality- 
structures (Dooyeweerd), identity-structures (Van Riessen), entitary 
structures (m yself), and idionomy (Verbrugge). In following a verbal 
communication by Roy Clouser the notion of a type-law is also suggested.
In conclusion a succinct overview is given of the all-pervasive and d i­
recting influence exerted by modern nominalism on the philosophical 
development of the past five centuries - both in its rationalistic and 
irrationalistic variations.
1. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary philosophy of science indeed triggered off serious 
challenges to traditional theories of rationality. Since Popper relativized 
the uncritical nature of a positivistic "faith in reason" (Popper, 1945:231 
f f ) ,  the nature of scientific rationality has undergone a further 
scrutinization in the hands of Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Stegmuller 
and others. However, within the whole legacy of Western epistemology
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one subtle assumption constantly surfaced: the supposition that 
conceptual knowledge constitutes the nature of rational knowing. A 
closer analysis of the multi-dimensionality of rationality, especially in 
connection with the nature of universality and the limits of concept- 
formation, is needed in order to gain more clarity about our ability to 
know. B y  doing this, our attention could not bypass traditional 
philosophical problems which directed in some or other way the main 
contours of Western philosophizing, such as the problem concerning 
universality and individuality. In passing, the problem of unity and 
multiplicity will also demand our attention.
2. U N IV ER SA L IT Y  AND PA R T IC U LA R IT Y
The relationship between individuality and universality has confronted
*
philosophy from its very  beginning. Plato was puzzled by the changing 
appearance of sensorially perceptible individual entities and took refuge 
to their supposed super-sensory (un iversal) 'essence' (eidos) to account 
for the underlying constant element which guarantees their knowability. 
Aristotle started from the pure individuality of his primary substance 
but had to transcend it to account for concept-formation in universal 
terms. The ideas of Plato were transformed into the creational ideas in 
the 'Divine Mind' during the middle ages, accompanied by Aristotle's 
(universal) secondary substance which was considered to represent the 
universal form of things having as a permanent substratum matter.
The realistic metaphysics of S t. Thomas tried to synthesize the 
Aristotelian lex naturalis (with its dual teleological order) with certain 
fundamental biblical motives - ending with an idea partly inspired by St. 
Augustine which related the lex naturalis to a transcendent lex aeterna 
as the plan of creation in the divine Mind. The true beings of things 
are given as ideas in God's Mind. In a derivative and limited form 
individual things participate in the being of God - for every individual 
thing there is a corresponding idea in God (Questiones Disputate de
* A most illuminating and penetrating discussion of Aristotle's wrestling 
with this relationship was published by K. Zigterman (1981:18-53).
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Veritate, 111:8). Furthermore, Aquinas considered univer 31s
(universalia) to have a threefold existence: universalia ante rem (the 
real existence of ideas before the creation in God's Mind); in re (in the 
things as their universal substantial forms) and post rem (their subjective 
existence in the human mind as universal concepts).
Emphasizing the primacy of the will (over against St. Thomas’ choice for 
the primacy of the intellect), Ockham's nominalism only acknowledged the 
subjective existence of universals in the human mind (mens humana), 
encompassing both words (voces) and general concepts (conceptus) - 
since every universal is a purely mental quality, no universal can really 
exist outside the mind (Summa Logicae, 1:14). Nothing but individual 
things exist in reality. Science, however, is still concerned with 
universals but then only as the subjective universal image of the real 
individual entities. Consequently, nominalism shifted the criterion of 
truth (for realism given in the adequatio intellectus et res) to the inner 
activity of the human mind - truth concerns the compatibility of concepts.
2.1 Universality and individuality in the Reformational Philosophy of 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd
Vollenhoven acknowledged this relationship as a fundamental and 
legitimate philosophical problem, and developed the systematic view that 
universality is always accompanied by individuality and vice versa. He 
distinguished between three fundamental determinations of reality, namely 
the determination ('bepaaldheid') of model functions ("zus en zo"), the 
determination of "this and that" and the determination of good and evil. 
He called the difference between 'zus' and 'zo' (such and such) modal, 
and designated the difference between a 'this' and a 'that' individual. 
In the history of philosophy Vollenhoven detected three possible positions 
concerning the relationship between the universal and the individual: 
universalism, partial universalism and individualism (cf. Vollenhoven, 
1961:3). However, the descent of the terms 'un iversality ' and 
'individuality' are not accounted for by Vollenhoven.
The same applies to Dooyeweerd. He also frequently used the terms 
individuality and universality. What Vollenhoven called the "this and 
that"-determination is designated by Dooyeweerd as "structures of
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individuality". The way in which the law of God holds for creaturely 
subjects is often explained by using the expression "universal validity" 
(Dooyeweerd, 1953:151 f f ) . But nowhere in his works one will find any 
systematic analysis of the peculiar way in which these terms are used 
and whether they stem from either the dimension of "structures of 
individuality" or from the dimension of modal aspects.
In spite of this shared lack of explanation, there are also differences 
present in Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven's appreciation of the 
relationship between universality and individuality.
2.2 Some differences between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven
Dooyeweerd distinguished between the universality of God's law and the 
individuality of entities subjected to this (universally valid) law. 
Individuality is therefore, according to him, a feature of factual reality. 
Vollenhoven, on the other hand, distinguished between the universality 
of God's law and the universal law-conformity of subjects which are 
correlated with God's law (Vollenhoven: 11). Dooyeweerd used the terms 
law' and 'law-conformity' ('wet' and 'wetmatigheid') interchangeably.
I think Vollenhoven's distinction helps us better in understanding the 
relationship between universality and individuality on the one hand, and 
that between God's law and what is subjected to it on the other hand. 
Every entitary subject shows its being subjected to the universality of 
God's law in a universal way simply by being such and such. Being 
human, for instance, means nothing less than evincing certain universal 
features which are generally present in every particular human person. 
These features are factual features which must be distinguished from the 
law to which they conform. Conforming to a law is therefore a universal 
feature of subjects. (Compare the literal meaning of the Dutch term: 
'wet-matig' = following the 'measure' of the law .)  Every particular 
person is not totally characterized by his factual individuality since his 
being a human person is part and parcel of his factual creaturely 
existence. Lingually this state of affairs is reflected in the respective 
use of the articles a' and 'the'. 'This ' man/woman is 'a' human being; 
'this' chair is 'a' chair; etc.
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Nevertheless, this perspective still does not give an account of the 
peculiar mode in which the terms universality and individuality are used. 
A possible alternative approach may be pursued along the following lines.
2.3 A crucial distinction: concept and idea
In the 'Festschrift' for Van Riessen (Strauss, 1982:159-173) I have 
explored one of his favourite philosophical sayings in certain directions. 
One of the most fruitful avenues opened up by this investigation was 
given in the new account of the distinction between concept and idea 
(limiting concept). It turned out that modal terms may be used in two 
distinct (though not separable) ways:
(i) Either to describe states of affairs displaying themselves within 
the limits (modal boundaries) of a specific aspect, or
(ii) they may be used to designate states of affairs which transcend 
the limits of the aspect in which the descriptive term has its original 
seat.
The firs t option provides us with a conceptual use of modal terms, 
whereas the second one underlies an idea-use of such terms. Let us 
consider a few examples:
The expression 'modal terms' refers to those terms which stem from 
the dimension of modal aspects. In the special sciences these terms 
mostly surface in a functional context - such as set (arithm etic), 
neighbourhood (topology), constancy (kinematics), causality 
(physics), life (biology), and so on. Terms designating functional 
relationships must be distinguished from concepts of concrete 
entities, such as atoms, molecules, macro-molecules, macro-systems, 
plants, animals, and so on. Important facets of this distinction 
between entitary and function concepts are already discussed in 
Cassirer's work from the year 1910: Substanzbegriff und 
Funktionsbegriff (B e r lin ).
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(a) Modal concepts are always formulated in relation to universal 
features of the different modal aspects (for example the concept 
natural number, set, dimension, cause and effect, and so on). 
Suppose we are thinking about a specific chair. If we look at the 
way in which this chair functions within the universal numerical mode 
of reality, we may refer to its feature of having four legs. Our 
concept of all chairs in this category must include the numerical 
feature of having a certain number of legs. Besides this conceptual 
use of numerical terms, we may reverse our approach and try  to say 
something about the entire concrete existence of this chair, still by 
using numerical terms only. In this case we may say that this chair 
is unique. Another idea-use of the meaning of number is given in 
the expression: "This individual (particular) chair". The 
individuality of this chair is not at all limited or restricted to its 
numerical modal function. On the contrary, when we speak about 
its individuality we are thinking about the total existence of this 
particular chair, displaying its individuality in all its facets. But 
at the same time we must uphold that our idea of its individuality 
cannot be formed without the foundational (constitutive) aid provided 
by the primitive meaning of number - only on the basis of our 
numerical intuition of a multiplicity of distinct entities are we able 
to speak about the distinctness, uniqueness and individuality of this 
chair. This idea of its uniqueness and individuality is nothing but 
a limiting and referring way in which the point of entry of the 
arithmetical aspect is used.
(b ) An idea-use of the modal meaning of the spatial aspect (with its 
inherent meaning of continuity, i .e . ,  connectedness, implying the 
notion of coherence as well as the original spatial whole-part 
relation), entitles us to form the idea of the typical totality character 
(wholeness) of this chair, which refers to the trans-modal meaning 
of being an individual entity. Sure ly, this usage is distinct from 
the conceptual undertaking in which we try  to measure the spatial 
dimensions of this chair, for in the latter case we are not using 
spatial terms to refer to the concrete reality of the chair which 
transcends the limits of the spatial aspect. Here we are simply 
interested in the way in which the chair functions concretely within 
the limits of the spatial aspect.
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(c) The modal meaning of continuation (uniform motion, persistence, 
constancy), revealing the irreducible nature of the kinematical as­
pect, serves as point of entry to our idea of the identity of this chair 
and must be distinguished from the concept of the relative movement 
of the chair.
(d ) The original physical meaning of change is synonymous with the 
modal meaning of energy-effect which may be identified with the 
cause-effect relation (causality ). An idea-usage of the meaning of 
change provides the counterpart of the idea concerning the identity 
of the chair - it is ever-changing. Once again this idea should be 
distinguished from the typical, universally comprehensible, function 
it has in the physical modality (for instance its being weak or strong 
or its having a certain mass).
If we extend these idea-usages of the meaning of the mentioned aspects 
to approach reality in its totality, we may (partly  following Van Riessen) 
say that everything is unique, everything coheres with everything else, 
everything remains identical to itself, and everything changes. Idea- 
statements (limiting concepts) like these do not exclude each other, but 
imply and presuppose each other.
From our preceding analysis we are in the position to trace the modal 
descent of the terms individuality and universality. Without our intuition 
of the nuclear meaning of number we won't be able to understand the 
distinctness or individuality of any entity. As such this notion therefore 
represents an idea-use of the modal meaning of number which transcends 
the limits of this aspect in its reference to the uniqueness of entities. 
The term universality, on the other hand, is only accessible on the basis 
of our understanding of the irreducible meaning of the spatial mode, 
because it refers to the spatial notion of location - whatever is considered 
to be universal is supposed to apply everywhere, i.e . universally. Its 
use is determined by the spatial time-order of simultaneity (at once). 
However, it seems that we here use the term universality in a conceptual 
sense, at least if we stick to the original modal meaning of space 
(continuous extension). When we approach the meaning of 'every' - in 
the sense of "each one" or even "all places" - from the arithmetical mode, 
we cannot side-step the deepened numerical meaning of infinity, namely
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the idea of an infinity of instances present at once (the "at once infinite"
in distinction from the primitive numerical meaning of infinity. the 
'it
"successive infin ite") In this case we are using the number-idea of the 
"at once infinite" (traditionally known as the "actual in fin ite").
The irreducibility of individuality and universality is therefore intimately 
connected with the irreducibility of the aspects of number and space, 
because these two modes fundamentally condition our reflection on the 
universality and particularity of entities - although it does not imply that 
we can deduce the nature of individuality from any modal aspect.
3. A NEW PER SPEC T IV E  ON RATIONALISM  AND IRRATIONALISM
Concept-formation is always bound up with the universal order for, and 
the universal orderliness of things. This implies, as we saw, that one 
cannot grasp the individual side of entities in a concept. Aristotle took 
this restriction to imply that the individuality of things is beyond the 
grasp of knowledge. Contrary to this view, we must recognise the fact 
that everybody has knowledge of things in their individuality, i.e . has 
knowledge of the individual side of things, even though this kind of 
knowledge is not conceptual. Much rather it is of a limiting and 
approaching nature, referring to the individual side of entities in terms 
of universal features. But this is simply another way to specify what 
'ideas-knowledge' is all about - an idea concentrates a conceptual 
d iversity upon (or refers it to) that which transcends the limits of all 
concept-formation.
* In an uncompleted study on the Philosophy of the Infinite these 
distinctions are developed in confrontation with foundational research 
in mathematics.
**  De Vleeschauwer still continues this legacy consistently by saying: 
"B u t knowledge about what is individual is simply impossible" 
(1952:213).
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The standard legacy on rationality and knowledge sticks to this 
restriction of (rational) knowledge to conceptual knowledge. We may 
define this approach as rationalistic. Rationalism elevates the universal 
(or universality) as the only source of knowledge. Irrationalism, on the 
other hand, always wants to pay tribute to the contingent uniqueness 
of the individual side of things or events which, as we saw, transcends 
the limits of concept-formation. Irrationalism leaves no room for real 
conceptual knowledge.
Although it is tempting to define this divergent appraisal of the 
relationship between the universal and the individual in terms of the 
opposition between universalism and individualism, the latter opposition 
may be reserved to indicate alternative basic denominators for the cosmic 
diversity of aspects and entities.
REMARK: Individualism and Universalism
Those theoretical total-views of reality which use the discrete na­
ture of the aspect of number (or analogies of number in later 
aspects) to explain cosmic reality in this entirety are called 
individualistic. Everyth ing is reduced to a discrete multiplicity of 
elements (sometimes thought of as being in interaction - cf. 
sociological individualism). Universalism, on the other hand, 
rejects this 'additive' approach by claiming that some kind of a 
whole precedes every individual which is simply a dependent part 
of the larger whole. This use of the spatial whole-part relation 
(or analogies of this relation in other aspects) has numerous 
possibilities. Mostly it is associated with an organic whole and its 
parts, although it is possible to think organicistically in an 
individualistic way (b y  emphasizing the discrete numerical analogy 
in the biotical aspect) - one may mention Spencer who, in spite of 
his organicism, advocated a more pronounced individualism instead 
of a more pronounced nationalism. In his Politics, Aristotle indeed 
gave one of the classical formulations of universalism: "The state 
is, clearly, by nature prior to the household or to the individual 
human being; for the whole must be prior to the part" (1253 a 
19-20). Modern system theory, following the foundational work of 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, consistently explored a universalistic
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approach to reality with its emphasis on systems (wholes) and 
sub-systems (parts).
3.1 A provisional comparison between Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven
Vollenhoven used these terms to indicate an overestimation of individuality 
and universality, respectively. Dooyeweerd, on the other had, used the 
correlation of universality and individuality (identified by him with the 
relation between law and factuality) to characterize the difference between 
rationalism and irrationalism. His denial of universality at the factual 
side of reality (the orderliness of entities) caused an unnecessary 
restriction in his definition of rationalism and irrationalism. Rationalism, 
in our view, is founded on an absolutization of conceptual knowledge, 
and we have seen that concepts are formed in terms of universality. 
But then rationalism cannot any longer be defined as an absolutization 
of the law-side of reality, as Dooyeweerd did, because universality is 
also present at the factual side of reality. Furthermore, it is then also 
insufficient to define irrationalism as an absolutization of the factual side 
of reality. It seems more appropriate to say that whereas rationalism 
leaves no room for true idea knowledge, irrationalism leaves no room for
*
genuine conceptual knowledge.
Although we do want to follow Vollenhoven in his distinction between law 
(order for) and Law-conformity (orderliness o f), we prefer (in terms of 
our newly proposed understanding of the distinction between concept and 
idea on the basis of the irreducibility of individuality and universality), 
to call an over-estimation of universality rationalistic and an over­
estimation of individuality irrationalistic.
A comprehensive analysis of the distinction between rationalism and 
irrationalism, dealing with conceptions within the tradition of 
reformational philosophy and developing a confrontation with other 
philosophers, is found in Visagie, 1979:246 ff. His distinctions in 
this respect are in harmony with the approach advocated in this 
article.
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3.2 Rational knowing in the ontology of Henk Hart
According to Henk Hart "rational knowing" is "our understanding of 
structures, our grasp of general patterns, our insight into laws, kinds 
and properties (1983:16). C learly, this definition is restricted to 
conceptual knowledge, banning idea-knowledge from the sphere of 
rationality. Although his whole argument about the integrality of human 
knowing, transcending the limits of "rational knowing" (or, in terms of 
our approach: conceptual knowing), is directed against the dominance 
of rationalism in our Western culture and scientific endeavours, he 
himself, in this respect, is still a victim of that very  rationalistic 
tradition I
It is a pity that Hart did not enrich his excellent ontology of universality 
(1984) by implementing the distinction between concept and idea 
explicitly. Of course he had no alternative but to use modal terms 
frequently in idea-contexts without realizing it as such. For example, 
one will find an idea-use of the biotic term development (p . 152), of 
coherence and unity (p . 243), unity (p .244), of dimensions (p . 260), 
of historical terms (p. 265) and even explicit idea-statements bout God 
(p. 319). Consider this last example. Hart states: "God is the origin 
of order. Theoretical analysis of God would require God to be within 
those bounds. But God is never subject to an order, nor limited by an 
structure" (p. 319). What Hart is actually saying, by using terms with 
a spatial connotation (such as 'subject' and 'limited') negatively, is that 
a conceptual use of terms stemming from within the bounds of the order 
of the world will never be appropriate when dealing with God. It is a 
small step ahead to acknowledge that, nevertheless, it is imperative that 
such terms are to be used in a referring and approximating (idea-)sense 
if we want to speak rationally about God at all. But then his own implicit 
identification of knowledge with conceptual knowledge should be 
transcended. Elsewhere, when Hart says: "God trancends creation" (p. 
337), he also does not realize that the term 'transcend' is nothing but a 
spatial term used in an idea-context.
In respect of the nature of individuality Hart once again stumbled on the 
illuminating distinction not drawn by him. Already on page 32 he 
mentions that, according to Hempel, rational disciplines or sciences can
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give an account of their subject-matter only in terms of general concepts, 
since none have the ability to " ’grasp the unique individuality' of things
- not even history". On page 78 he says that a concept is our grasp 
of conditionality (in its un iversa lity). "Consequently, about all that we 
can understand about individuality is that we all know it (my emphasis, 
DFMS). We intuitively grasp it, though we do not have a concept of it". 
As was the case in his 1983 article, Hart here also implicitly identifies 
rational knowing with conceptional knowing, but at the same timé leaves 
room for someone to 'know' something by intuitively grasping what cannot 
be known conceptually. The 'knowledge' implied in this "intuitive 
grasping" is nothing but what we have termed idea-knowledge!
3.3 The universal side of entities in Hart's ontology
Hart correctly claims that universality and individuality are traits, not 
entities (1984:19). To this he adds the statement that norms, conditions, 
laws and so on relate universally to all thing "that in turn relate 
individually to them" (p . 19). One here implicitly senses a denial of 
the universal side of concrete entities - a fear that is strengthened later 
on when we read: "Subjects meet conditions uniquely, even when it is 
the same condition they meet" (p . 73). He proceeds: "No two frogs are 
the same, even though all frogs are frogs. The responses of any two 
frogs to the conditional order or configuration which we might call 'being 
a frog', which determines the reality of any possible frog, are individual 
responses” (p. 37). C learly, "being a frog" may not be identified with 
the conditions for being a frog. Frogs are creaturely subjects, and 
"being a frog" is a feature of these creatures, not of the order for their 
existence. We have argued above that "being a frog" (or: being an atom) 
is nothing but the universal way in which a concrete entity shows its 
being subjected to the universal law-order holding for its existence. In 
other words, it is not sufficient to state that individuality is the "way 
in which subjective existence meets conditions" (Hart, 1984:72), since 
every concrete creature meets the conditions for its particular existence 
both in its uniqueness and typicality (compare section 5 below).
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4. STUART FOWLER ON GOD'S LAW AND THE PER S ISTEN T  
R EG U LA R IT IES  IN CREATION
Fowler reacts critically to the triadic distinction present in the thought 
of Spykman, Taljaard, Hart and Wolters - the distinction between three 
kinds of 'realities': God, law and creation: "Without claiming that this 
is the whole story about our knowledge of creational laws, therefore, 
these writers appear to be agreed in claiming that science involves an 
'uncovering', albeit incomplete and tentative, of the ordering laws of 
creation, by theoretical analysis of the ordered creation" (Fowler, 
1987:8). Fowler is convinced that "the idea of creational laws revealed 
in our experience of creation lacks biblical support" for "Scrip ture clearly 
testifies that creation reveals the person of God, in his righteousness, 
power and d ivin ity, as the person who orders creation and guides and 
instructs man as his covenant partner in all the affairs of human life" 
(p. 8 ). Consequently, he wants to deny that "a coherent theoretical 
account of the Creator-creation relation" can be given "in terms of o r­
dering laws mediating between God anci creation and accessible to rational 
thought about human experience of creation" (pp. 8-9).
According to him it is unbiblical to assume that "there is a distance 
between God and creation that is bridged other than by the person of 
God himself” and that "given the right conditions for that thought, the 
law that orders reality is accessible to rational human thought" (p .9). 
Whoever tries to think about "a set of impersonal laws that can be grasped 
in conceptual categories" (p .9) is engaged in impersonalizing God's 
personal ordering Word for creation. Postulating an impersonal law-order 
"owes more to the pagan notion of world-order of the Greek intellectual 
heritage than to the Biblical witness, even though it is identified with 
the Word of God" (p .9 ). Fowler stresses that the confession that the 
world of human experience is the creation of God ordered by his Word 
as its law in no way requires the notion that this Word is a law-order 
consisting of rules and conditions that God has set between himself and 
creation as some kind of third category linking God and creation. "The 
Word of God that is the ordering law for creation is not an intelligible 
order of laws detachable from the active presence of God, but is the 
self-consistent, righteous will of God for his creation that is implemented
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by his personal a c t iv ity  in the  crea tion . . . .  The idea of o rd e rin g  laws 
d is t in c t from  God and his o rd e rin g  a c t iv ity  underm ines the immediacy of 
the G od/crea tion  re lation  th a t is so fundam ental to  the b ib lica l reve la tion" 
(P .9 ).
4.1 The Word o f God - the  problem  of u n ity  and m u ltip lic ty
Repeatedly we are in form ed th a t the  "Word o f God th a t o rde rs  c rea tio n ", 
is " the  one, in d iv is ib le  Word th a t cannot be broken up o r analysed in to  
d iscre te  ru les in the  manner of the laws of na ture  we fo rm u la te  in ou r
'fc
science" (p . 10). A lthough  Fowler fu l ly  acknowledges the  o rd e rin g  Word 
of God as the  "co rre la te  of the o rd e r (Fow ler here should have used the 
word o rd e rlin e ss ' - DFMS) we experience in the  o rde red  re a lity  of 
crea tion '' he also holds th a t "we have no access to  the  con ten t o f the  
o rd e rin g  w ill o f G od": "I suggest, th e re fo re , th a t we need to  abandon 
as a vain im agination the  idea, p e rs is te n t in Western though from  the  time 
of ancient Greece, th a t human th o u g h t can gain access, in one way o r 
ano ther, to  the  fundam ental s tru c tu r in g  p r in c ip le s , o r o rd e rin g  laws, of 
the u n ive rse ” ( p . 10).
I t  is s t r ik in g  th a t Fow ler here  him self speaks im personally about " s t ru c ­
tu r in g  p r in c ip le s , o r o rd e r in g  laws, o f the u n ive rse "! Also no tew orthy 
is the p lu ra l:  p r in c ip le s , laws. I f  God's o rd e r in g  Word (w ill)  is "one 
and in d iv is ib le " ,  then e ve ry  p lu ra li ty  o f laws seems to  be excluded. 
F u rthe rm ore , i f  he is serious in his acceptance o f the  co rre la tio n  between 
the "p e rs is te n t re g u la r it ie s "  (c f.  p . 11) we can on ly  experience (and on ly  
have access to ) ,  and the o rd e r in g  w ill o f God, then i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to  
uphold th is  m ystica l s im p lic ity  m etaphysics: how can God's o rd e rin g  law 
be "one and in d iv is ib le "  w h ile  c re a tu re ly  re a lity , co rrespond ing  to  th a t 
w ill,  is m u ltifa r io u s  and d ive rse !?  Fowler claims th a t what "we can know, 
and all we can know, of God's o rd e rin g  w ill fo r  crea tion  is w hat we
On th is  page we once more read about the  "one in d iv is ib le  o rd e rin g  
W ord". On page 12 we s im ila rly  read: "C rea tion  is o rdered by the 
a c t iv ity  o f th e  personal God fu lf i l l in g  his one, in d iv is ib le  w ill fo r  
c re a t io n " .
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experience o f o rdered  re a lity  - . . .  - to g e th e r w ith  th e  norm ative  goals 
fo r  human life  revealed th ro u g h  the  S c r ip tu re s "  (p . 10). A re  these 
"norm ative  goals" to be seen as God's o rd e rin g  w ill fo r  human beings? 
I f  so, th e n , in th is  reg a rd , God's 'revea led w ill ' is no longe r "one and 
in d iv is ib le "  b u t d iffe re n tia te d  and specified  acco rd ing  to  the  v a ry in g  
contents of these "norm ative  goa ls "! La te r on he speaks about "norm ative  
c r ite r ia "  and about " the  s tru c tu re  of n o rm a tiv ity "  ( p . 12), p rom p ting  the 
question : Does the  " s tru c tu re  o f n o rm a tiv ity "  o r  "n o rm a tive  c r ite r ia "  
belong to God's w ill?  We are also fre q u e n tly  in form ed th a t th e re  are 
ce rta in  "em pirica l and logical c r ite r ia "  (c f.  p . 10). What is th e ir  (o n tic ) 
status?
What Fowler e v id e n tly  d id  not recognize, is th e  a u the n tic  G reek 
"s im p lic ity  m etaphysics" p resen t in his own a ffirm a tio n  o f God's w ill as 
being "one and in d iv is ib le " .  From the  e leatic school o f Parmenides, w ith  
its  emphasis on th e  (s ta tic )  and in d iv is ib le  oneness (u n ity )  o f be ing , 
Western ph ilosophy co ns tan tly  underw en t the  in fluence  o f th is  s im p lic ity  
speculation in va rious ways. E specia lly in th e  d o c tr in e  about th e  na tu re  
o f God, scholastic and re fo rm ationa l theo logy is fundam enta lly  in fluenced  
by the  Greek specu la tion  about th e  u n ity  and in d iv is ib i l i ty  o f be ing and 
d iv in ity .  Fow ler goes a step fu r th e r  than  th is  tra d it io n a l theolog ica l 
d o c trin e  about God: he p u lls  God's law fo r  crea ted  re a lity  in to  the  "one 
and in d iv is ib le "  'n a tu re ' o f God - though  in c o n s is te n tly , since (as we 
have m entioned) he o ften  re fe rs  to  th e  "law s o f n a tu re " ( in  th e  p lu ra l)  
in th e  sense o f God’s w ill fo r  n a tu re : " I t  is im p orta n t to  note th a t ,  on 
th e  account I am g iv in g  here , laws o f n a tu re  are to  be d is tin g u is h e d  from  
th e  observed  re g u la r it ie s  th a t  ev idence them . Laws o f n a tu re  are  not
*  V isag ie  dem onstrates th is  G reek legacy c o n v in c in g ly . He shows th a t 
th e  combination o f d iv in ity  and oneness dates back to  th e  6th and 
5 th  cen tu ries  B .C . w here Xenophanes a lready used i t .  V ia neo­
p latonism  (c p . th e  e levated position  o f the  in d iv is ib le  'One' in 
P lo tinus ’ th o u g h t)  and A u g u s tin  (who app lied  w hat P lo tinus said 
about th e  'One' to  G od), dogm atic th in k in g  co n s ta n tly  used th is  
p re -occupa tion  w ith  u n ity  (and s im p lic ity )  as opposed to  m u lt ip l ic ity .  
(C f. V isag ie , 1980:1-13.)
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to  be id e n tifie d  w ith  system atic logical fo rm u la tions of observed pa tterns 
o f re g u la to ry . They are la w -like  fea tures of the o rd e r of n a tu re , as an 
o rdered re a lity , th a t are evidenced in observed re g u la r it ie s . I t  is these 
la w -like  fea tures th a t s c ie n tif ic  laws endeavour to  represent in law- 
fo rm u la tions" ( p . 11).
F irs t o f all we want to po in t ou t th a t the so-called "s c ie n tific  laws" are 
based on the  mentioned re g u la r it ie s , b u t (a t least in non-nom inalis tic  
tre n d s ) aim at fo rm u la ting  w ha tever holds as o rd e r fo r  the  observed 
re g u la r it ie s . In o th e r w ords, science do not aim at p u re ly  fic t it io u s  
law s', b u t at on tic  laws w hich hold fo r  created re a lity . Furtherm ore , 
i f  the  "laws o f n a tu re " (as p a rt o f God s w ill)  are evidenced in "observed 
re g u la r it ie s ", i t  remains d if f ic u lt  to  exp la in  w hy th is  evidence could not 
ra tio n a lly  be re lated to God s "o rd e r fo r "  w hich is evidenced in them. 
Evidence is always re fe r r in g  and p o in tin g  tow ards something else. I can 
th in k  o f no b ib lica l g round  th a t would p rec lude  rationa l access to God's 
law fo r  w ha tever is sub jected to  th a t c reationa l law and even 'e v id in c in g ’ 
it .
4 .2  Lack o f d iffe re n tia tio n  in the  "W ord o f God"
However, I th in k  I can see w hy Fow ler ob jec ts . It. is because he does 
not s ta r t  from  the  d is tin c tio n  between C rea to r and c rea tion , b u t from  the 
tr ia d ic  problem  o f God, crea tion  and the  c re a tio n -o rd e r as a b ridge  
between God and crea tion . T h is  problem  stems from  Vollenhoven who 
used to speak about th e  be ing  o f God, the  be ing o f God's law, and the 
being of c rea tion . From o u r ana lysis o f nominalism we can see th a t 
nominalism does not acknow ledge th e  u n iv e rs a lity  o f o n tic  laws. B ut 
whereas tra d it io n a l nominalism transposes th is  un ive rsa l o rd e r fo r  th in g s  
in to  th e  human mind ( i . e . ,  in K a n t’s no tion , d iscussed below, o f ou r 
u n ders tand ing  as the un ive rsa l la w -g iv e r o f n a tu re ) , Fowler transposes 
all c reationa l laws in to  the  "one and in d iv is ib le "  w ill o f God! I f  we take
*se rious ly  the  completion o f creation (mentioned in Genesis 2 :1 ) ,  the  
c ruc ia l questions are: is th e re  a d iffe re n ce  between crea tion  and the
Fowler is also ambiguous on th is  p o in t. He sometimes speaks about
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uphold ing  of creation? and: what belongs to  creation? The f i r s t  
d is tin c tio n  needed here is th a t between God's c rea tive  act " in  the  be­
g in n in g "  in C h r is t (c f .  V o l .1 :1 6 ), and G ods o n -go ing  care fo r  and 
upho ld ing  of creation  in C h r is t (C o l.1 :1 7 ). C h r is t,  as God's C reative  
Word and M ainta in ing  W ord, must be d is tin g u ish e d  from  God's Law-Word 
(C re a t io n -O rd e r) . The la tte r  belongs to crea tion  and should be 
d is tin g u ish ed  from  C h r is t th ro u g h  Whom all th in g s  were created and now 
s t ill consis ts .
God's expressed w ill fo r  crea tion  belongs to crea tion , and crea tion  in its 
to ta lity  - both w ith  respect to  its  law -s ide  and fac tua l side - is cons tan tly  
depending on the  ca ring  and upho ld ing  Word of God (C h r is t ) .  I t  is o f 
no use to claim th a t God's w ill belongs to  God - because w ha tever is 
sub jected to God's laws also belongs to  God! One cannot argue th a t the  
laws to which c rea tu res  are subjected should be connected w ith  God, 
because eve ry  c rea tu re  equa lly  is connected to  God sim ply by  its  being 
crea ted .
I t  is also no tew orthy  to  mention the  fa c t th a t Fowler com plete ly ignores 
the  dimension o f modal u n iv e rs a lity .  What he calls "p e rs is te n t 
re g u la r it ie s " are on ly  re lated  to  ty p ic a l e n tit ie s  w hich fu n c tion  in a 
specified  way in the  d if fe re n t  modal aspects o f re a lity  (com pare o u r n ex t 
s e c tio n ). The id e n tif ica tio n  o f th e  modal dim ension as such, 
d is tin g u ish ab le  from  th e  dimension o f e n tit ie s , req u ire s  an appeal to  God's 
o rd e r  fo r  c re a tu re ly  sub jec ts , because no s ing le  ty p ic a l fu n c tio n  o f 
w ha tever e n t ity  w ith in  any modal aspect could be accounted fo r  w ith o u t 
acknow ledging th e  u n d e r ly in g  u n ive rsa l modal s tru c tu re  w hich as such 
makes all specified  fu n c tio n s  w ith in  i t  possib le . T yp ica l laws are  found  
on th e  basis o f observed  re g u la r it ie s , whereas un ive rsa l m odalities are
★
id e n tif ie d  w ith  th e  aid o f modal a b s tra c tio n . The modal o rd e r -d iv e rs ity
th e  o rde red  c rea tio n , im p ly ing  som ething com pleted, and sometimes 
about God's o rd e r in g  w ill,  suggesting  an on -g o in g  concern .
*  Nowhere in  his a rt ic le  we f in d  a c r it ic a l assessment o f what we should 
cons ide r to  be th e  d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re  o f s c ie n tif ic  th in k in g .  W ithou t 
a rg u in g  i t  in any d e ta il,  I w ant to  p o in t o u t th a t th is  is on ly  to  be
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the re fo re  has the  sta tus o f law - i t  is one dimension o f crea ted  re a lity  
as to  its  law -s ide . I f  Fowler wants to  be cons is ten t, he should f i r s t  o f 
all transpose also the  dimension o f modal u n iv e rs a lity  in to  th e  "w ill of 
God”  and then  deny its  d iv e rs ity  on the  g round  th a t God's o rd e rin g  w ill 
fo r  crea tion  is "one and in d iv is ib le " !  The cen tra l commandment of love 
does have an unspec ified  and in te g ra l meaning - b u t i t  belongs to  created 
re a lity  w here i t  is specified  accord ing to  modal and typ ica l laws: the 
way in w hich we love God w h o le -hea rted ly  a n a ly tica lly  is by id e n tify in g  
and d is tin g u is h in g  c o rre c tly ; the way in which we love God w h o le -h e a rtily  
economically is by  exe rc is ing  ou r s tew ardsh ip  in a fru g a l fash ion ; the 
way in which we love God w h o le -h e a rtily  in communal re la tionsh ips such 
as th a t of the  sta te  is by s tr iv in g  tow ards a ju s t p u b lic  legal o rd e r ; e tc.
The wisdom lite ra tu re  of the Old Testam ent does not have any problems 
in seeing God's expressed w ill fo r  creation as be longing to  crea tion  - ju s t 
compare Psalm 148, p ra is in g  the constancy of God's decrees. (Fow ler 
also m entioned th is  Psalm in pass ing , w ith o u t engaging him self in 
ana lysing th is  face t - cp . p. 10.)
Fowler accused H a rt, W olters and o the rs  th a t they  id e n tify  a G reek notion 
of a la w -o rd e r w ith  th e  Word of God - b u t i t  tu rn e d  ou t th a t he attempted 
exactly  th e  reve rse ; he id e n tif ie d  God's Word w ith  the  law -s ide  (o rd e r 
fo r )  o f c rea tion  - and b y  do ing  th a t, under th e  in fluence  o f the 
m etaphysical G reek specu la tion about the  oneness and in d iv is ib il ity  of 
being (p ro je c te d  on to  God) had ( in c o n s is te n tly )  to  deny the  inhe ren t 
d iv e rs ity  in  th is  la w -o rd e r. When we acknowledge creation  both w ith 
respect to  its  law -s ide  and fac tua l s ide , we do not need th e  notion 
(c o rre c tly  re jected  by  Fow ler) th a t some th ird  'b e in g ', the  'la w -o rd e r' 
th a t should mediate between God and c rea tio n , because from  th e  B ib le it  
is q u ite  c lea r th a t C h r is t  mediates between God and crea tion  - as 
'c re a tio n -M e d ia to r ', as 'u ph o ld in g -M e d ia to r' and as 'redem ptive  M edia tor'. 
T h is  th re e fo ld  m edia ting  role o f C h r is t as Word o f God shou ld , however,
found  in modal a b s tra c tio n . T h is  fe a tu re  does not exclude an analysis 
of e n tit ie s  in re a lity , because the  modal aspects serve  as po in ts  of 
e n try  to  re a lity  - and in science as modes of exp lanation (c f. 
S ta fleu , 1987).
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cons tan tly  be d is tin g u ish ed  from  the  law -s ide  of created re a lity ,  i.e . from  
God's law -o rd e r in its  va rious dim ensions (modal, ty p ic a l,  temporal and 
ce n tra lly  re lig io u s ).
I w ant to  raise one last po in t in th is  connection . Fowler n e ith e r 
accounted fo r  the  na tu re  of concept-fo rm a tio n , nor fo r  the  role of 
u n iv e rs a lity  in th is  co n tex t. If we do accept w ith  him th a t, fo r  example, 
God's w ill fo r  physica l re a lity  accord ing  to its  kinem atical aspect relates 
to the  u n ifo rm ity  o f phys ica l movement, he m ust acknow ledge the 
u n iv e rs a lity  o f God's (acco rd ing  to  him: conceptua lly  unknow able) "one 
and in d iv is ib le "  w ill fo r  c rea tio n , fo r  i f  th is  w ill o f God does not hold 
u n iv e rs a lly  fo r  all m oving c re a tu re ly  sub jec ts , no re g u la r ity  would be 
d isce rn ib le  in ou r experience  of m oving e n tit ie s . However, to 
acknowledge th is  entails the kn o w a b ility  of God's w ill in respect o f its  
u n iv e rs a lity ! B ut if  we cannot deny its  u n iv e rs a lity , a lbe it God's p e rs ­
onal decree fo r  c re a tu re ly  sub jec ts , then  we have the dec is ive  cond ition  
ava ilab le  fo r  all concep t-fo rm a tion , because concept-fo rm a tion  always 
proceeds from  un ive rsa l fe a tu re s . C onsequen tly , in th is  line o f th o u g h t 
we e ve n tu a lly  embraces God's personal care fo r  crea tion  conceptua lly  - 
co n tra d ic tin g  the fa c t th a t God transcends crea tion  w ith  its  d if fe re n t 
fea tures (such as u n iv e rs a lity ) .  The d iffe re n ce  between concept and idea 
is here needed - b u t i t  p re -supposes the  d is tin c tio n  between God’s 
C reation-W ord , U pho ld ing-W ord , Inca rna te  W ord, Redemptive Word and 
Law-W ord.
4 .3  Dooyeweerd and Nominalism
We have re fe rre d  to the  fa c t th a t nominalism acknowledged u n iv e rs a lity  
on ly  w ith in  the  mind o f the  human sub jec t (e ith e r  as un ive rsa l concepts 
o r as un ive rsa l w o rd s ). R ecalling th e  d e fin it io n  w hich we have g iven 
fo r  ra tionalism  and irra tio n a lism , we may now ask the  ques tion : is 
nominalism ra tio n a lis tic  o r  ir ra t io n a lis t ic ?  In respect o f th e  typ ica l 
s tru c tu re  of e n tit ie s , nominalism does not accept any co n d itio n ing  o rd e r 
(u n ive rsa l s tru c tu re s  fo r ) ,  o r any o rd e rlin e ss  (u n ive rsa l s truc tu re dn e ss  
o f) such e n tit ie s . E ve ry  e n t ity  is s t r ic t ly  in d iv id u a l, in term s o f o u r 
mentioned d is t in c tio n , we may say th a t nominalism s u re ly  rep resen ts  an 
ir ra t io n a lis t ic  view in connection w ith  the  s tru c tu re  o f e n tit ie s , since 
e ve ry  e n t ity  is com pletely s tr ip p e d  from  its  un ive rsa l o rd e rlin e ss  (law -
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con fo rm ity ) and co n d itio n ing  o rd e r . T h is  c h a ra c te r is tic  applies to  both 
moderate nominalism, v iz . conceptualism  (Ockham, Locke, Le ibn iz , and 
o th e rs ) and to extrem e nominalism th a t re jects all general and abstrac t 
ideas and accepts on ly  general names (B e rke le y , B rentano and o th e rs ).
Th is  ir ra t io n a lis t ic  side of nominalism, however, does not exhaust the 
m ultiface ted  na tu re  of nominalism, because un ive rsa ls  are fu lly  
acknowledged in the  human m ind, at least as general words in the case 
o f B e rke ley 's  and B ren tano 's  extrem e nominalism. T h is  re s tr ic tio n  of 
knowledge to  un ive rsa ls  is ty p ic a l o f ra tionalism  in the  sense defined by 
us. T he re fo re , i t  is possible to  see nominalism as being sim ultaneously 
ra tio n a lis tic  in term s of the  un ive rsa ls  - concepts and words - in one's 
m ind, and ir ra t io n a lis t ic  in terms of the  s t r ic t  in d iv id u a lity  o f en titie s . 
(Nominalism 's appra isa l o f the  supposedly non -u n ive rsa l na tu re  o f con­
cre te  e n titie s  is of course in te rn a lly  antinom ic, fo r  these en titie s  d isp lay  
at least one un ive rsa l fe a tu re : be ing  in d iv id u a l!)
In th is  co n tex t we on ly  w ant to  emphasize th a t Dooyeweerd's lack of 
app rec ia ting  the  un ive rsa l side o f concre te  en titie s  fu n c tio n in g  at the 
factual side of re a lity  s im ply continues an element o f nominalism's 
ir ra t io n a lis t ic  view on th e  p u re  in d iv id u a lity  o f en titie s  ou ts ide  the human 
m ind '. For th is  reason he s t i l l  id e n tif ie d  the  concreteness o f en tities  
w ith  th e ir  in d iv id u a lity  - compare his fre q u e n tly  used saying th a t th in g s  
fu n c tion  in a concre te ly  in d iv id u a l way in th e  un ive rsa l modal aspects.
5. "MODAL IN D IV ID U A L IT Y /T Y P IC A L IT Y " - STAFLEU AND 
DOOYEWEERD
In o rd e r to  proceed from  his analysis of the modal aspects of re a lity  to 
the  s tru c tu re s  of in d iv id u a lity ,  Dooyeweerd discussed " th e  problem of 
in d iv id u a lity  w ith in  the  modal cadre of the  law -spheres" as a tran s itio n a l 
theme (1955:414 f f ) . The key-idea  in his d iscussion is th a t the  modal 
meaning m ust be 'in d iv id u a liz e d ' (423 f f ) . A lthough I can fu l ly  appreciate 
th e  examples of "modal in d iv id u a lity "  g iven by him, I do th in k  th a t the 
way in  w hich he accounted fo r  them is p rob lem atic . I f  i t  is tru e  th a t 
u n iv e rs a lity  and in d iv id u a lity  are ir re d u c ib le  to  each o th e r (closely 
connected w ith  the  ir re d u c ib i l i ty  o f the  num erical and spatia l po ints of
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e n try  used to speak about u n iv e rs a lity  and in d iv id u a lity ) ,  then it  is in 
p rin c ip le  im possible to  speak about an 'in d iv id u a liz a tio n ' o f th e  modal 
meaning of any aspect - fo r  the  la tte r  is s t r ic t ly  u n ive rsa l.
S ta fleu , in fo llow ing  Dooyeweerd, made a d is tin c tio n  between ty p ic a l laws 
and modal laws. The fo rm er app ly  on ly  to  a lim ited class o f sub jec ts , 
whereas the la tte r  have a genera l ch a ra c te r. To th is  he added the 
fo llow ing  exp lana tion : "O u r f i r s t  d is t in c tio n  (law  and sub jec t) is 
fre q u e n tly  id e n tif ie d  w ith  the  d is tin c tio n  of un ive rsa ls  and in d iv id u a ls . 
However, th is  id e n tifica tion  is inadequate and too c ru d e , since the 
d is tin c tio n  o f typ ica l and modal laws also implies a u n iv e rs a l- in d iv id u a l 
d u a lity "  (S ta fleu , 1980:6).
The 'tw o -s id e d ' na tu re  o f e n tit ie s , d isp la y in g  both an in d iv id u a l and a 
un ive rsa l side, implies th a t the  concreteness o f any e n t ity  comes in a 
tw o -s ided ' way to expression  w ith in  the  "u n ive rsa l cad re " of the  modal 
aspects. As such, e ve ry  e n t ity  fu n c tio n s  in a concrete  in d iv id u a l and 
in a concrete  un ive rsa l way w ith in  the modal aspects. Dooyeweerd 
c o rre c tly  s tressed the  fa c t th a t "n o t a s ing le  law -sphere  may be 
considered as the exc lus ive  o r ig in  o f in d iv id u a lity "  (1955:418). However, 
keeping in mind th a t the  term  co n c re te ly  encompasses both the  in d iv id u a l 
and the un ive rsa l sides o f an e n t ity ,  we cannot any longer m aintain the 
notion o f modal in d iv id u a lity  as it  is used by Dooyeweerd. V iewed from  
the angle of the modal aspects, one th e re fo re  encounte rs various forms 
o f in d iv id u a lity  and o rd e rlin e ss  w ith in  each m oda lity . The typ ica l 
s tru c tu re  o f an e n t ity  specifies (b u t never in d iv id u a lize s ) the  un ive rsa l 
modal s tru c tu re  o f an aspect. I t  is p re fe ra b le  to  speak in th is  co n tex t 
o f modal s p e c if ic ity  in stead o f modal in d iv id u a lity .  Therm odynam ics, fo r
*
example, is a general and fundam ental phys ica l d is c ip lin e , a b s tra c tin g  
completely both from  the  in d iv id u a lity  and the  s p e c if ic ity  o f physica l 
e n titie s . I t  th e re fo re  uses modal fu n c tio n  concepts such as volume, 
e n tro p y , spec ific  heat, e tc . w ith o u t re fe rence  to any e n t ita ry
Th is example is taken from  Stafleu w here he discussed the  way in 
which therm odynam ics abs tra c ts  from  the  ty p ic a l s tru c tu re  o f physica l 
en titie s  (S ta fle u , 1966:133 f f ) .
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spec ifica tion . In s ta tis tica l physics th is  abstrac tion  can no longer be 
m ainta ined, since here one has to  account fo r  the  re la tion  between the 
phys ica l m ic ro -s tru c tu re s  c o n s titu tin g  m acro-system s, and 
therm odynam ics. T h is  implies th a t the typ ica l to ta lity -c h a ra c te r  of 
phys ica l e n titie s  should be recogn ized. T he re fo re , specific  heat is dealt 
w ith  d if fe re n t ly  in  s ta tis tica l phys ics  accord ing  to  the  physica l sta te  of 
phys ica l en titie s  (compare the so lid  sta te  w ith  the  gaseous s ta te ). In 
therm odynam ics, however, the  expression spec ific  heat is used in a 
p u re ly  m oda l-functiona l sense, w ith o u t any specifica tion  as regards the 
na tu re  of a so lid  s ta te , f lu id  sta te  o r  gaseous sta te .
Instead of id e n t ify in g  the  m oda l/typ ica l d is tin c tio n  w ith  th a t between 
u n iv e rs a lity  and in d iv id u a lity ,  we shou ld , th e re fo re , use the d is tin c tio n  
between (un sp e c ifie d ) u n iv e rs a lity  and specified u n iv e rs a lity . The la tte r 
fo rm  o f u n iv e rs a lity  is re s tr ic te d  to  a p a rt ic u la r  class o f subjects whereas 
the fo rm er applies w ith o u t any spec ifica tion  o r qua lifica tio n  to  all possible 
sub jects . I t  is fo r  th is  v e ry  reason th a t the  fo rm er ty p e  of u n iv e rs a lity  
is an essentia l fe a tu re  o f the  modal aspects - a fte r  a ll, e ve ry  e n tity  
fun c tion s  in p rin c ip le  in eve ry  modal aspect.
6. SU ITAB LE CATEGORIES
Dooyeweerd uses the term  in d iv id u a lity -s tru c tu re  to  ind ica te  the 
a p p lic a b ility  of a s tru c tu ra l o rd e r fo r  the existence of in d iv id u a l e n titie s . 
Van Riessen p re fe rs  to  call th is  law fo r  en titie s  id e n tity -s tru c tu re s , since 
as such it  guarantees the p e rs is te n t id e n tity  o f all en titie s  (1970:158). 
S toker speaks about " id io nn e " (1984:7 f f . ) ,  in o rd e r to  ind ica te  the 
ow n-stance ' ( 'e ie s ta n d ig he id ' and not 'substance ') o f en titie s  (c f .  also 
S toke r 1967:240 f f . ) .  My own p re fe rence  is to  use the  notion o f e n t ity -  
s tru c tu re s , since eve ry  e n t ity -s tru c tu re  guarantees both the  in d iv id u a lity  
and th e  id e n tity  o f e ve ry  concrete  e n t ity .  In a recent w o rk , M. V e r- 
b ru g g e  (1984) in troduces  h is own d is t in c t system atic account about the  
na tu re  o f (w hat he ca lls ) fu n c to rs , a w ord  also used b y  Henk H art fo r 
the  dimension of e n titie s  (H a rt, 1984:445-446). As a su b s titu te  fo r  the 
notion of an in d iv id u a lity -s tru c tu re ,  V e rb ru g g e  advances the term : 
id ionomy (1984:81 f f ; 91 f f ) .  Of course th is  term  may also cause 
m isunde rs tand ing  i f  i t  is taken to  mean th a t each in d iv id u a l c rea tu re
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(sub je c t) has its own un ique law. What is in tended is th a t eve ry  type  
o f law (nomos) is meant to de lim it and determ ine un ique  sub jects . In 
o the r w ords, however specified  the  u n iv e rs a lity  o f the  law may be, it  
can n eve r, in its bearing  on un ique in d iv id u a l c rea tu re s , its e lf become 
an (un iq u e ) in d iv id u a l. A n o th e r way of g ra sp in g  the meaning of 
Dooyeweerd's notion of an in d iv id u a lity  s tru c tu re  is, in fo llow ing  an oral 
suggestion by  Roy C louser (Z e is t, A ugus t 1986), to  call i t  a typ e -la w . 
Th is  sim ply means th a t all en titie s  o f a ce rta in  ty p e  conform  to th is  law. 
Perhaps, fo r  the sake of c la r ity ,  we may recall the  re fe rence  to  the 
perspective  g iven by M .D . S tafleu (1980:6, 11). T yp ica l laws ( ty p e -  
laws, such as the Coulomb law - app licab le  on ly  to  charged e n titie s  and 
the Pauli p r in c ip le  - app licab le  o n ly  to  fe rm ions) are special laws which 
app ly to  a lim ited class of en titie s  o n ly , whereas modal laws hold 
u n ive rsa lly  fo r  all possible e n tit ie s .
7. NOMINALISM: THE UNDERLYING MOTIVE-POWER IN MODERN 
PHILOSOPHY
A t th is  po in t we must mention the  fa c t th a t the  dual n a tu re  o f nominalism 
forms the  s ta r t in g -p o in t o f two d iv e rg in g  ph ilosoph ica l developm ents in 
modern ph ilosophy.
(a ) On th e  one hand, i t  p ro v id e d  rationa lism  w ith  th e  p o s s ib ility  to
e levate human reason to  th e  level o f th e  c re a to r o f a ra tiona l o rd e r
in re a lity .  T h is  fo llow s from  th e  fa c t th a t nominalism in fa c t
transposes th e  un ive rsa l side o f e n tit ie s  in to  the  human m ind. B u t,
as we have ind ica te d , the  u n ive rsa l side o f en titie s  is no th ing  b u t
th e  m anifestation o f th e  cond itionedness o f e n titie s  by  the  re levan t
un ive rsa l o rd e r fo r  th e ir  ex is tence . C onsequen tly , i f  an e n t ity  is
s tr ip p e d  o f its  o rd e rlin e ss  ( its  u n ive rsa l s id e ), i t  is sim ultaneously
s tr ip p e d  o f its  be ing sub jected  to  a u n ive rsa l crea tiona l o rd e r . What
is le ft is fac tua l re a lity  in its  u n s tru c tu re d , chaotic  in d iv id u a lity
it
and p a r t ic u la r ity  (c o n tin g e n c y ). D rive n  by th e  new m otive of
*  From G risebach the  South A fr ic a n  ph ilo so p he r, G erha rd  Rauche,
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logical c rea tio n , th is  v e ry  fe a tu re  o f nominalism enabled modern 
ph ilosophy from  Descartes onwards to re co n s tru c t all o f re a lity  in 
terms o f na tu ra l s c ie n tif ic  th o ug h t (cha racte rized  by Husserl as the 
ra tio n a lis tic  sc ience-idea l) (c f.  H usse rl, 1954:119 f f ) . O n ly the 
extrem e consequences o f th is  na tu ra l sc ience-idea l, cance lling  in 
p rin c ip le  also human freedom , were questioned by Kant. W ithin the 
( lim ite d ) domain o f the  sc ience-idea l, however, Kant drew  the 
u ltim ate  ra tio n a lis tic  conclusion of nominalism. The way in which 
he w orked  th is  ou t was s tro n g ly  in fluenced by  Galilei (c f. Holz, 
1975:345-358). In re la tion  to the na tu ra l sc ie n tif ic  meaning of 
constancy and change, Galilei fo rm ula ted a th o ug h t-e xpe rim e n t, and 
w ith o u t ta k in g  account of any sense-experience, a rr iv e d  at his law 
o f in te r t ia . O ut of the spontaneous s u b je c tiv ity  of man's pure  
u n d ers tand ing  he de rived  th is  law and p rescribed  it  to  moving 
e n tit ie s . T h is  p rep resen ts  the c ruc ia l epistemological tu rn  in modern 
ph ilosophy in a sc rib ing  the p rim acy no longer to the ob ject, bu t to 
the sub ject. Kant drew  the radica l 's u b je c tiv is tic ' conclusion: the 
laws o f na tu re  are a p r io r i contained in the sub jective  unders tand ing  
of man: "u nd e rs ta nd in g  creates its  (a p r io r i)  laws not o u t o f na­
tu re , b u t p rescribes  then to n a tu re " (1783, p a r. 36, p . 320).
Indeed, Kant tr ie d  to  consolidate and s treng then  the preced ing 
na tu ra l sc ience-idea l, be it  in the  re s tr ic te d  form  o f the 
ra tio n a lis tic a lly  e levated u n d ers tand ing  w hich (though lim ited to 
s e n s ib ility  in o rd e r to  save a separate sup e r-se n so ry  domain fo r  the 
p ra c tica l-e th ica l freedom o f autonomous man) is considered to be the 
a p r io r i (fo rm a l) la w -g ive r o f na tu re ! Nominalism created a vacuum 
by leaving  fac tua l re a lity  in its  in d iv id u a lity  u n s tru c tu re d . In o rd e r 
to  f i l l  up the  lack o f determ ina tion  thus crea ted , Kant in troduced 
human u n d ers tand ing  to take hold o f th is  vacant pos ition . To be 
su re , Kant d id  not m erely transpose the  un ive rsa l side of en tities
in h e rite d  the fo llow ing  problem : "B u t can man ex is t at all 
w ith o u t c o n s titu t in g  himself? Can he ex is t in u tte r  
con tin ge n cy? " (c f. Rauche, 1966:97). For both o f them con­
tin g e n t experience sim ply represen ts th a t which is g iven to  us 
in its  u n s tru c tu re d n e ss .
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in to  human u n d ers tand ing , b u t in fa c t elevated human unders tand ing  
to the level o f the co n d itio n ing  o rd e r fo r  th in g s .
(b ) On the o the r hand, nominalism p rov ided  a s ta r t in g -p o in t fo r  a ll those 
tren d s  in modern ph ilosophy w h ich , in an ir ra tio n a lis t ic  fash ion, 
wanted to  take the un ique and co n tin ge n t cha rac te r o f (m ostly 
designated as: h is to rica l)  re a lity  se riou s ly . T h is  avenue opened 
up by nominalism was fo llowed up by a v a r ie ty  of h is to r ic is tic  
designs in modern ph ilosophy , fo r  example from  the fo r th  phase of 
F ichte 's th o u g h t up to  pragm atism , ex is ten tia lism  and contem porary 
neo-M arxism . I f  re a lity  is tr ip p e d  both of its  o rde rliness  and o f its 
being subjected to a cond ition ing  un ive rsa l creationa l o rd e r , i t  seems 
to be a s e lf-e v id e n t h is to r ic is t t r u th ' th a t e v e ry th in g  is u ltim ate ly  
h is to rica l and th e re fo re  taken up in the  dynam ic and con tingen t 
eve r-ch a n g ing  flow  of h is to rica l even ts.
8. CONCLUSION
Due to the fa c t th a t the  modal aspects (u n iv e rs a lly )  cond ition  o u r 
theore tica l re flec tion  on the na tu re  o f created re a lity , i t  is not s u rp r is in g  
th a t th e y  co -cond ition  the v e ry  way in w hich we have to account fo r  the 
way in which we can re fle c t upon the  na tu re  o f rationa l know ing in both 
its  fo rm s: conceptual knowledge and idea know ledge.
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